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RECENT CASE NOTES
act pertaining to another occupation classed by the company as more
hazardous, but in no way pertaining to his own occupation?" The court
then said in answer to these questions: "Clearly, the language is ambigu-
ous, and the latter construction, which is more favorable to the insured,
must prevail." The rule of construction thus applied is clearly the correct
one and represents the decided weight of authority. Travelers' Protective
Association v. Jones, 75 Ind. App. 29, 127 N. E. 783; Queen Ins. Co. of
Anzerica v. Delphi Strawboard Co., 76 Ind. App. 47, 128 N. E. 697; 14 R.
C. L. 926; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 316. The construction seems the reasonable
one. See Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding Co., 179 N. C. 489, 102 S. E.
887. But contra, Ebeling v. Banker's Casualty Co., 61 Mont. 58, 201 Pac.
284.
"1. . . insurer was liable for the full amount of the policy . . .
since the provision relating to reduced indemnity did not contemplate inhibi-
tion of acts the performance of which was necessarily implied from the
vocation stated in the policy" Thorne v. Casualty Co. of America, 106 Me.
274, 76 Atl. 1106; King v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., - Mo. App.
-, 248 S. W. 984. The evidence indicates that the act done here was not
one which was beyond Holbrook's duties as "chief operator and superin-
tendent' and the fact that incidentally the act was one customarily per-
formed by a lineman is immaterial. That this distinction is made in the
cases see note 22 A. L. R. 780, 781; also, King v. Standard Accident Insur-
ance Co., supra.
Ebeling v. Banker's Casualty Co., 61 Mont. 58, 201 Pac. 284, and the
cases therein cited have not been overlooked, and the reasoning of the
Montana court is not without force. On the whole, however, the reason-
ing of the North Carolina court in Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding Co.,
supra, is sounder. In the Ebeling case the insured was classified as a
"proprietor and meat cutter in shop," and he was killed while engaged
(temporarily) as a "tender in transit of live stock." The report of the
case gives little or no evidence, but it would seem to be a reasonable pre-
sumption that one employed as a "proprietor and meat cutter" would
hardly be called upon as such to act as "tender in transit of live stock."
In the principal case the evidence was clear that as "chief operator and
superintendent" Holbrook was expected, and others employed in similar
positions with the service company were expected, to do just what Hol-
brook was called upon to do in this case. In this matter we need not
indulge in presumptions, . . . the evidence seems clear enough. It is
because of this difference in the facts between the Ebeling case and the
principal case that we can distinguish the cases. That this same duty or
act pertained to a more hazardous occupation is immaterial. Thorne V4
Casualty Co. of America, supra; King v. Standard Accident Insurance Ca.,
supra. The pertinent question is, whether it was in any way connected
with the insured's occupation? If it was, plaintiff was entitled to recover
$5000.00. T. R. D.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SEARCH AND SEIZUR--PROBABLE CAusE--Act-
ing on information furnished by an anonymous telephone call, officers
searched an oil truck driven by Ds, and found liquor. Truck had no mark-
ings, no oil faucets, bad several milk cans on the sides, was carrying but
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one Illinois license plate, was being driven on a highway commonly used
by rum runners and the drivers refused to stop when first ordered and
laughed when arrested. Held combination of suspicious circumstances gave
officers reasonable and probable grounds to believe a felony was being com-
mitted and justified a search of the car without a warrant under Burns
1926, Secs. 2175 and 2748 (the quotation of Sec. 2175 by the reporter,
Sec. 2176 is probably the one meant). Faut v. State, Sup. Ct. Ind., Oct. 8,
1929, 168 N. E. 124.
The question of probable cause in search and seizure cases is still very
unsettled in Indiana but such cases as have been decided have shown a
tendency to be careful that the circumstances were sufficiently suspicious
to justify the search. An officer who has not learned, thru the exercise
of his senses or thru other reliable information, facts which would justify
a reasonable person in believing that a felony was being committed cannot
search an automobile without a warrant. Eier v. State, 196 Ind. 252. An
anonymous telephone call is not strong enough grounds to justify a search,
even when the cars were described and officers noticed them to be heavily
ladened. U. S. v. Allen, 16 Fed. (2nd) 320, (cited with approval in the
principal case). Search after an arrest on other grounds was held suffi-
cient in Koseloski v. State, 199 Ind. 546, 158 N. E. 902; Hoberstick v. State,
196 Ind, 145, 147 N. E. 625. But no other offense was apparent here, opera-
tion with one license plate being permitted under Burns 1926, See. 10087.
The suspicious character of an automobile alone is not sufficient ground
for search. Robinson v. State, 197 Ind. 144, 149 N. E. 891; Boyd V. State,
198 Ind. 55, 152 N. E. 278. But container commonly used to carry liquor,
carried in plain sight in the car, gives rise to probable cause Thomas V.
State, 196 Ind. 234, 146 N. E. 850; Guelting v. State, 196 Ind. 643, 148
N. E. 146. Refusal of driver to stop when hailed by officers is not reason-
able grounds for belief that driver was transporting liquor. Robinson V.
State, 197 Ind. 144, 149 N. E. 891. Demeanor of one who, after being
stopped by a sheriff, not having actual knowledge that a felony is being
committed, told officer that car contained "red whiskey" was held to be
insufficient grounds for search of the car by the sheriff. Dancaster v.
State, 197 Ind. 635, 151 N. E. 724.
The majority of states have followed the Federal rule of allowing a
wide discretion in the officers making a search of a car. "Information from
a credible source, together with facts indicating such information is cor-
rect will justify a search of an automobile without a search warrant."
Brady v. U. S., 300 Fed. 540; People v. De Ceasar, (Mich., 1922) 190 N.
W. 302. Suspicious actions of one on previous occasions were held suffi-
cient cause for search in Hauck v. State, (Ohio, 1922) 140 N. E. 112. The
fact that the one arrested was driving on a road notorious for its use by
bootleggers was held to lessen the requirements for probable cause in La-
fazia v. U. S., 4 Fed. (2nd) 817.
The principal case, while requiring less comprehensive reasons to jus-
tify search without a warrant than most previous Indiana decisions, seems
sound and is probably in accord with the majority of states. J. S. G.
JUDGMENT-ACTION UPON-APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-.
On June 25, 1914, appellee recovered three separate judgments in the Lake
Circuit Court against appellant. No execution was issued on any of these
